University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship

University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce
School of Law

1-1-2005

Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal Can-Spam Act
Roger Allen Ford
University of New Hampshire School of Law, roger.ford@law.unh.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons,
and the Mass Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Roger A. Ford, Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal Can-Spam Act. 72 U. CHI. LAW REV. 355
(2005).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact sue.zago@law.unh.edu.

File: Readthru 1

Created on: 1/24/2005 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 2/10/2005 3:30:00 PM

Preemption of State Spam Laws by the
Federal CAN-SPAM Act
Roger Allan Ford†
Unsolicited bulk commercial electronic mail is increasingly a
1
problem on the internet. More than thirteen billion spam messages
2
are sent per day. One study estimates that spam costs $10 billion an3
nually in worker productivity in the United States. In 2003, spam for
4
the first time surpassed 50 percent of all email sent on the internet.
That same year AOL, the world’s largest internet service provider
5
(ISP), blocked 500 billion spam messages sent to its users —about fifteen thousand per user, or more than forty per user per day. The total
amount of spam received is even greater: millions more make it
through filters to their recipients.
† S.B. 2002, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D. Candidate 2005, The University of
Chicago.
1
Though it now refers primarily to a type of email, “spam” as a pejorative term on the
internet first referred to irrelevant or inappropriate mass messages posted to Usenet newsgroups. See Spam, Jargon File 4.4.7 (Dec 29, 2003), online at http://www.faqs.org/docs/jargon/
S/spam.html (visited Nov 14, 2004) (discussing different meanings of the word “spam”). The first
significant instance of Usenet spam came in 1994, when two Arizona immigration attorneys,
Laurence Canter and Martha Siegel, posted advertisements for their services to more than 6,000
of the 9,000 newsgroups then in existence. See Mike Godwin, Electronic Frontier Justice and the
“Green Card” Ads, Internet World 97 (Oct 1994) (discussing the controversy that arose around
Canter and Siegel’s ads). Canter was eventually disbarred, in part because of the advertising
campaign. See Sharael Feist, The Father of Modern Spam Speaks, CNET News.com (Mar 26,
2002), online at http://news.com.com/2008-1082-868483.html (visited Nov 14, 2004).
The name itself comes from a 1970 Monty Python’s Flying Circus sketch in which a waitress
recites a menu containing “egg and spam; egg bacon and spam; egg bacon sausage and spam;
spam bacon sausage and spam; spam egg spam spam bacon and spam; spam sausage spam spam
bacon spam tomato and spam. . . .” David Crystal, Language and the Internet 53 (Cambridge
2001). Spam thus symbolizes the mindless, annoying repetition of mass commercial email. See id
at 53–54.
There are as many definitions of spam as there are definers. One common definition refers
to all commercial email. A narrower view applies the label only to unsolicited email, or to bulk
email. See, for example, Spam, Jargon File 4.4.7 (listing six definitions of “spam”). Because of the
lack of consensus on just which emails are spam, there is some inherent variance in any measure
of the harms caused by spam.
2
Evan I. Schwartz, Spam Wars, 106 Tech Rev 32, 34 (July/Aug 2003).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
AOL Is Blocking Spam, Wash Post E2 (Jan 5, 2004). See also AOL Press Release,
America Online Releases “Top 10 Spam” List of 2003 (Dec 31, 2003), online at
http://media.timewarner.com/media/newmedia/cb_press_view.cfm?release_num=55253692 (visited Nov 14, 2004).
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6

In short, internet spam is a significant problem, and both the federal government and various states have attempted to curb the prob7
lem. Thirty-six states have enacted antispam laws. Two have banned
unsolicited spam entirely, requiring recipients to opt in to receiving
8
such messages. In part due to the uncertainty and conflict these state
laws created, in 2003 Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the
9
CAN-SPAM Act. Thus far, though, these attempts to combat spam
10
have not had a significant effect on the amount of spam sent.
Technical issues make enforcement of any spam law difficult.
Spam senders frequently use forged email headers and send email
through third-party computers, often located overseas, that aren’t secured against outside use. It thus becomes difficult or impossible to

6
The argument can be made that some specific types of unsolicited email advertisements
may be beneficial. Indeed, Congress seems to hold this view. See note 32.
Whatever its problems, spam works. American consumers spent $50 billion shopping online
in 2003. See US Online Sales Hit $50bn in 2003, BBC News (Feb 23, 2004), online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3515287.stm (visited Nov 14, 2004). Of that amount, one
industry study found that consumers spent a full $11.7 billion on products purchased as a direct
result of unsolicited email advertisements. See Peter A. Johnson and Lee Johnson, The Growing
Value of Legitimate Commercial E-Mail: Consumer Purchases and Savings in 2003 (Direct Marketing Association White Paper Feb 24, 2004), online at http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/registered/
whitepapers/commercial_email.pdf (visited Nov 14, 2004) (examining the impact of email advertising on consumers’ spending habits).
This Comment nevertheless assumes that most types of spam pose substantial problems. For
a more thorough treatment of the problems spam creates for consumers, businesses, ISPs, and
marketers, see Hanah Metchis and Solveig Singleton, Spam, That Ill o’ the ISP: A Reality Check
for Legislators 4–7 (Competitive Enterprise Institute May 2003), online at http://www.cei.org/
gencon/025,03482.cfm (visited Nov 14, 2004).
7
See Part II and Appendix.
8
Restrictions on Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail Advertisers, 2003 Cal Legis Serv 487
(West), codified at Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529–17529.9 (West 1997 & Supp 2004); 11 Del Code
Ann §§ 937–38 (2001). See text accompanying note 49.
9
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub L
108-187, 117 Stat 2699 (2003), codified at 15 USC § 7701 et seq (Supp 2004) and 18 USC § 1037
(Supp 2004) (“CAN-SPAM”).
10 See, for example, Jonathan Krim, Spam Is Still Flowing into E-Mail Boxes: Senders
Evade Federal Law Banning Junk Messages, Wash Post E1 (Jan 6, 2004):

At California-based Postini Inc., which provides e-mail protection and filtering for businesses, spam reached a new high [the week the Act went into effect], accounting for 84.9
percent of the roughly 1 billion pieces of e-mail it handles each week. . . . At Brightmail Inc.,
the leading spam-filtering company, the number has held steady at about 60 percent of the
e-mail it handles. Internet account providers Earthlink and America Online said they also
have seen little measurable change in spam patterns in the past couple of weeks.
MX Logic, a company that produces email security software, found that seven months after the
law went into effect only 1 percent of spam messages complied with CAN-SPAM. Howard Witt,
22-Year-Old Thrives in World of Spam: Law Fails to Stop Flood of E-Mails, Chi Trib C1 (July 18,
2004) (citing an MX Logic study of 250,000 emails). The largest share of the world’s spam continues to come from the United States. See note 129.

File: Readthru 1

2005]

Created on: 1/24/2005 2:02:00 PM

Preemption of State Spam Laws

Last Printed: 2/10/2005 3:30:00 PM

357

11

track down senders. Senders themselves are sometimes located overseas. Even when one can track down an individual sender, it requires
substantial effort due to the techniques senders use to hide their iden12
tities. These technical obstacles make the cost of tracking down a
relatively skilled spam sender fairly high.
Were these technical obstacles surmounted, though, the CANSPAM Act might nevertheless have little effect on spam, because the
federal law is relatively weak—weaker on spam than some state laws,
13
and weaker than many experts had hoped. Although a strong case
14
can be made that spam should be banned outright, the CAN-SPAM
11 One potential solution is to target the client of the spammer—the business whose product or service is being advertised. Most spam exists to sell something. If such a sale takes place,
then money must change hands, typically through a credit card transaction. It is thus fairly easy
for authorities to determine the recipient of the money and track down one party responsible for
the spam. The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance, a nonprofit organization that
cooperates with the FBI to investigate spammers, has used this strategy successfully. See Saul
Hansell, Junk E-Mail and Fraud Are Focus of Crackdown, NY Times C1 (Aug 25, 2004). If the
client is a business located outside of the United States, however, then it would be beyond the
reach of U.S. law. The United States could make it illegal for credit card companies to do business with foreign businesses that violate U.S. spam laws, but both U.S. credit card companies and
foreign states are likely to oppose any such action, and in any event placing the burden on credit
card companies to determine whether their merchants use spam is unlikely to be politically or
practically feasible.
12 One particularly worrisome development was first presented by the MyDoom computer
worm, which caused more than $250 million in damage in January 2004. Andrew Stein, Microsoft
Offers MyDoom Reward: No. 1 Software Firm Offers $250,000 for Information on Creator of
Worm Seen Costing Firms $250M, CNN/Money (Jan 30, 2004), online at http://money.cnn.com/
2004/01/28/technology/mydoom_costs/index.htm (visited Nov 14, 2004) (listing lost productivity
and clean-up expenses as the main costs of MyDoom). The worm included its own mail server,
which could send email from the infected computer without the owner’s knowledge. Experts
believe that the worm’s development was funded by spammers as an experiment; once infected,
a computer could be programmed to start sending spam messages when a certain trigger event
occurred. Even if one could track down the sender, then, it would lead to an infected personal
computer rather than a server operated by the spam sender. See Bill Husted, Latest Worm Has
Professional Twist: Computer Experts Blame Spammers, Atlanta J & Const B1 (Jan 28, 2004)
(describing the chances of shutting down MyDoom as “virtually zero”).
13 See Stephanie Schorow, Enlarged Spam Law Has Many Frustrated, Boston Herald 38
(Jan 7, 2004) (quoting a representative of the Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email
as saying CAN-SPAM “is just a bad law. . . . [I]t fails the most basic test. It doesn’t tell anybody
not to spam.”); Spamhaus Project, United States Set to Legalize Spamming on January 1, 2004
(Nov 22, 2003), online at http://www.spamhaus.org/news.lasso?article=150 (visited Nov 14, 2004)
(discussing the relative weakness of CAN-SPAM).
14 Perhaps the most obvious argument for banning spam is that doing so corrects a market
defect. Sending spam has essentially zero marginal cost for the sender. At the same time, there
are substantial costs that are borne by recipients, ISPs, and other third parties. See Metchis and
Singleton, Spam, That Ill o’ the ISP at 4–7 (cited in note 6). Because spam imposes substantially
greater costs on society than on senders, an inefficiently high quantity of spam will be produced
absent regulation. Similar arguments led Congress to ban unsolicited fax advertisements. See
note 33.
A ban is not the only way to solve the market failure problem. Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk
instead suggest that spammers be required to pay email recipients for the right to send them
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Act ultimately permits some types of spam. More importantly, the Act
preempts many stronger state laws, including California’s law, which
went into effect on January 1, 2004, the same day as the CAN-SPAM
Act. It also doesn’t provide for a private individual right of action
against senders, leaving enforcement of the statute to government
officials and ISPs. Despite these factors, however, this Comment argues that the CAN-SPAM Act, when interpreted correctly, leaves key
state law provisions in force and is stronger than many antispam activists fear.
Part I of this Comment introduces the CAN-SPAM Act. It summarizes the Act’s substantive limits on spam and discusses its preemption provisions. Part II discusses the various attempts by states to
regulate spam. It describes the different types of provisions that states
have enacted and compares them to the CAN-SPAM provisions. Part
III briefly summarizes federal preemption doctrine. Part IV applies
this doctrine to the CAN-SPAM Act. It first discusses which state limits on spam are preempted by the Act. It then examines the preemption provisions’ effect on state laws’ enforcement mechanisms. While
many in the industry have assumed that the Act supersedes all state
15
spam laws, this Comment argues that the Act allows key portions of
some states’ laws to survive. Part V then briefly outlines some implications of this conclusion for spam control policy.
I. THE CAN-SPAM ACT
A. Substantive Provisions of the Act
16

After several failed attempts, in 2003 Congress enacted the
17
CAN-SPAM Act. The statute applies to email messages with the
“primary purpose” of “commercial advertisement or promotion of a
unsolicited messages, which would cause spammers to internalize the costs they impose on recipients. See Ian Ayres and Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 Yale J Reg 77, 135–37 (2003)
(discussing ways to ensure consumer privacy from intrusive marketing techniques).
15 For instance, one maker of email marketing software tells potential customers that
“[s]ince the CAN-SPAM Act supersedes any and all State-level email laws, it will be much easier
for you to keep up to date on [complying with anti-spam laws].” Lyris, Frequently Asked Questions About CAN-SPAM, online at http://www.lyris.com/CAN-SPAM (visited Nov 14, 2004)
(advising clients on ways to avoid legal difficulties under CAN-SPAM).
16 For example, the Netizens Protection Act of 2001, HR 3146, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (Oct
16, 2001), would have required unsolicited emails to include the sender’s name and address, and
would not have preempted state spam laws. The Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of
2001, HR 95, 107th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 3, 2001), would have banned false email headers, prohibited use of an ISP’s facilities to send spam in violation of that provider’s policies, and required
spam to be labeled as such. For a list of proposed laws that failed to pass, see David E. Sorkin,
Spam Laws, online at http://spamlaws.com/federal/index.html (visited Nov 14, 2004).
17 117 Stat 2699.
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18

commercial product or service.” There are no quantity requirements;
19
its provisions apply any time an advertiser sends an email message.
The Act bans some deceptive practices: it prohibits forged head20
21
ers and deceptive subject lines. It does not generally prohibit false or
deceptive messages, although such messages would likely be subject to
22
23
state deceptive trade practices laws or the Lanham Act’s prohibition
of unfair competition. The CAN-SPAM Act also lets states enact laws
specific to email that prohibit falsity or deception in commercial mes24
sages.
The Act also extensively regulates the structure of spam messages
and the techniques used to send them. It requires spam to contain a
25
method for recipients to opt out of later messages and to contain
identifying information, including the sender’s physical mailing ad26
dress. It also prohibits methods used to build email lists and evade
detection, including harvesting addresses from web pages and Usenet
27
newsgroups, using so-called dictionary attacks to send spam to thou18 CAN-SPAM § 3(2)(a), 117 Stat at 2701. Messages sent to customers with whom the
sender has a preexisting business relationship are excluded. Id § 3(17), 117 Stat at 2702. Spammers have already found one possible loophole in this definition: they can send messages with a
noncommercial “primary purpose” and a commercial secondary purpose. See Jonathan Krim,
Gates Wants to Give E-Mail Users Anti-Spam Weapons, Wash Post E1 (Jan 27, 2004) (noting one
message that claims: “The primary purpose of this email is to deliver you a ‘Crazy USA State
Law of the Week’—The secondary purpose of this email is to let you know: Click Here to Email
Advertise Your Web Site to 1,850,000 OPT-IN Email Addresses for FREE!”).
19 CAN-SPAM § 4(a)(1), 117 Stat at 2703.
20 Id § 5(a)(1), 117 Stat at 2706. The headers of an email message are the parts other than
the message body, including the to and from addresses, subject, date and time stamp, and information showing the path the message took before arriving in its recipient’s inbox. The CANSPAM Act defines “header information” to be “the source, destination, and routing information
attached to an electronic mail message, including the originating domain name and originating
electronic mail address, and any other information that appears in the line identifying, or purporting to identify, a person initiating the message.” CAN-SPAM § 3(8), 117 Stat at 2701. See also
Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working Group, Internet Message Format § 2.2 (Apr
2001), online at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2822.txt (visited Nov 14, 2004).
21 CAN-SPAM § 5(a)(2), 117 Stat at 2706.
22 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has
published the Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NCCUSL 1966) (recommending
money damages for victims of fraud or other unfair trade practices). At least thirty-six states
adopted legislation similar to the Uniform Act. William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice
Legislation, 46 Tulane L Rev 724 (1972) (listing states that have made “deceptive acts or practices” unlawful). See, for example, 6 Del Code Ann § 2532 et seq (2004) (setting a $10,000 cap on
money damages for deceptive trade practices); 815 ILCS 510/1–7 (West 2004) (adopting the
Uniform Act). See also Jonathan A. Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices (National
Consumer Law Center 5th ed 2001) (detailing states’ deceptive practices acts).
23 15 USC § 1125 (2000).
24 See Part IV.A.
25 CAN-SPAM § 5(a)(3)(A), 117 Stat at 2707.
26 Id § 5(a)(5)(B)(iii), 117 Stat at 2708.
27 Id § 5(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2708.
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28

sands of possible email addresses, automatically creating multiple
29
email accounts for the purpose of sending spam messages, and
transmitting messages through third-party computers without authori30
zation. Finally, the Act authorizes (but does not require) the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to establish a “do not email” registry, similar
31
to the “do not call” list for telemarketing.
The law is thus relatively comprehensive: it includes nearly every
type of antispam measure that the state laws include, short of an outright ban on spam. Ultimately, though, it falls short of what many an32
tispam activists believe is needed to combat spam: the law permits
28 Id. A dictionary attack consists of sending mail to email addresses generated from a
word list, such as a list of all the words in a dictionary. For example, an advertiser could send a
message to a@domain.com, aardvark@domain.com, abacus@domain.com, and so forth, working
her way through the list. For an even more effective address list, a spammer would also use a list
of common usernames, such as combinations of first and last names. Anyone who has an email
address on the resulting list will get the spam message, even if that email address is not otherwise
known to the public. This method is massively overinclusive—most of the resulting
email addresses will lead nowhere—but the economics of spam make it worthwhile. See
Michelle Delio, Hotmail: A Spammer’s Paradise?, Wired News (Jan 9, 2003), online at
http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure/0,1377,57132,00.html (visited Nov 14, 2004).
29 CAN-SPAM § 5(b)(2), 117 Stat at 2709.
30 Id § 5(b)(3), 117 Stat at 2709.
31 Id § 9, 117 Stat at 2716. The “do not call” list permits individuals to register as not wishing to receive telemarketing calls on their home and wireless telephones. The registry is established by 47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(2) (2003) (setting a five-year do-not-call period for registrees).
The Tenth Circuit rejected First Amendment and other challenges to the regulation in Mainstream Marketing Services, Inc v FTC, 358 F3d 1228 (2004), cert denied, 125 S Ct 47 (2004) (holding that the do-not-call list was valid because it advanced the government’s interest in safeguarding personal privacy).
The Tenth Circuit relied in part on Rowan v United States Post Office Department, 397 US
728 (1970) (upholding the right of a homeowner to reject receipt of certain materials through the
mail), in upholding the do-not-call list. Mainstream Marketing Services, 358 F3d at 1237. The
plaintiff in Rowan challenged a law that permitted recipients of sexual advertisements via mail to
opt out of receiving further advertisements from the same senders. The Court dismissed the
challenge, reasoning:

The Court has traditionally respected the right of a householder to bar, by order or notice,
solicitors, hawkers, and peddlers from his property. . . . To hold less would tend to license a
form of trespass and would make hardly more sense than to say that a radio or television
viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus bar
its entering his home.
Rowan, 397 US at 737. See also note 33.
32 See, for example, Schorow, Enlarged Spam Law, Boston Herald at 38 (cited in note 13);
Spamhaus Project, United States Set to Legalize Spamming (cited in note 13). Indeed, one common joke in antispam circles called the law the YOU-CAN-SPAM Act. Id.
The best explanation for the Act’s relative weakness is that Congress does not appear to
consider all spam to be bad. The Senate committee that recommended passing the Act distinguished between seemingly legitimate spam and fraudulent or misleading spam:
Unlike direct mail delivered through the post office to consumers, [unsolicited commercial
e-mail] can reach millions of individuals at little to no cost and almost instantaneously. Noting its effectiveness, the Direct Marketing Association has reported that 37 percent of con-
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spam within certain parameters, while many experts had argued that
only a complete ban on bulk unsolicited commercial email would ef33
fectively curb the spam problem. In addition, many of the Act’s spe34
cific provisions fall short of some states’ parallel restrictions.
35
The Act includes criminal provisions and permits civil enforce36
37
ment by state and federal agencies, by state attorneys general, and
38
by ISPs. Private citizens and businesses receiving spam messages that
violate the Act are not granted any enforcement power. Thus far, state
and federal authorities have taken only limited action under the law.
In April 2004, four people were arrested and charged with, among

sumers it surveyed have bought something as a result of receiving unsolicited e-mail from
marketers. However, in addition to legitimate businesses that wish to use commercial e-mail
as another channel for marketing products or services, spam has become a favored mechanism of those who seek to defraud consumers and make a living by preying on unsuspecting
e-mail users and those new to the Internet. As a result, Americans using e-mail, whether
new users or those who have used it for decades, are finding their e-mail in-boxes deluged
with unsolicited, and in most instances unwanted, promotions and advertisements that increasingly contain fraudulent and other objectionable content.
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, S Rep No 108-102, 108th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (2003), reprinted in 2004
USCCAN 2348, 2349.
33 There is precedent for a complete ban. In the analogous case of unsolicited advertisements sent by fax, Congress chose a complete ban. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, Pub L No 102-243, 105 Stat 2394, codified as amended at 47 USC § 227 (2000) (TCPA)
(banning most junk faxes and permitting recipients to sue the sender for the greater of actual
damages or $500). In 2003 the Eighth Circuit upheld the TCPA against a First Amendment challenge. Missouri v American Blast Fax, Inc, 323 F3d 649 (8th Cir 2003). The court held that the
government has a substantial interest in preventing the cost shifting and interference with recipients’ fax machines associated with junk faxes, and that the ban was in proportion to that interest
and was narrowly tailored to that interest. See id at 656–58.
A similar argument might apply to spam. Most end users pay for their internet connection,
and so a significant portion of the cost of spam is shifted to users. Likewise, the torrent of spam
interferes with recipients’ ability to use email productively. The argument is yet more forceful
with ISPs, which incur substantial bandwidth and filtering costs as a result of spam. If lesser
measures are not successful—and all signs so far indicate that they are not—then a ban could be
the least restrictive means of achieving a substantial government objective.
Some spam opponents have argued that the junk fax ban can be used to sue email spammers
as well. See, for example, Paul Festa, Spam Law a Matter of Fax?, CNET News.com (Mar 26,
2003), online at http://news.com.com/2100-1028-994076.html (visited Nov 14, 2004). At least one
court has rejected this argument. See Aronson v Bright-Teeth Now, LLC, 2003 Pa Super 187, 824
A2d 320, 321–22 (2003) (reasoning that a personal computer does not meet the definition of fax
machine under the TCPA). See also David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 Buff L Rev 1001 (1997) (concluding that although a spam message might technically meet the wording of the law, Congress clearly did not
intend for the anti–junk fax law to apply to email).
34 See Part II.
35 CAN-SPAM § 4(a), 117 Stat at 2705.
36 Id § 7(a)–(d), 117 Stat at 2711–12.
37 Id § 7(f), 117 Stat at 2712–14.
38 Id § 7(g), 117 Stat at 2714–15.
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39

other crimes, violating the CAN-SPAM Act. A few ISPs have also
40
filed lawsuits.
The Act’s ISP enforcement provision, in particular, could be a
strong tool against spam. It provides for statutory damages of up to
41
$100 per false or misleading message received, up to $1 million total.
If the defendant violated the law “willfully and knowingly,” then the
42
plaintiff can recover treble damages. The Act also allows courts discre43
tion to award attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, a large ISP like AOL, which
44
receives billions of spam messages per year, could take action against
some of the largest senders; this could deter other senders. Enforcement by spam recipients presents a collective action problem that
ISPs might be in the best position to solve. ISPs face substantial costs
from spam, and they have the resources to track down senders and
take them to court. ISPs also have incentives to do so, since they can
45
compete for customers on the basis of how much spam they receive.
B.

The Act’s Preemption Provision

Section 8(b)(1) of the Act addresses preemption of state laws. It
states:
This Act supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or
political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of
electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent
39 See Hiawatha Bray, Federal Antispam Law to Be Put to Its First Test, Boston Globe A1
(Apr 29, 2004) (describing federal charges against four Michigan men who allegedly used email
to sell fraudulent weight-loss products).
40 See Saul Hansell, 4 Big Internet Providers File Suits to Stop Leading Senders of Spam,
NY Times A1 (Mar 10, 2004) (describing lawsuits by AOL, EarthLink, Microsoft, and Yahoo
against alleged spammers, including a “former leader of a neo-Nazi organization who turned to
selling penis enlargement pills”). See also Handyman Celebrity’s Web Site Sued for Sending
Spam, Natl J Tech Daily, AM Ed (Mar 5, 2004) (reporting that a small ISP sued the operator and
marketer of BobVila.com for allegedly sending email ads to consumers who had opted out of the
site’s email list).
41 CAN-SPAM § 7(g)(3)(A)–(B), 117 Stat at 2715.
42 Id § 7(g)(3)(C), 117 Stat at 2715.
43 Id § 7(g)(4), 117 Stat at 2715.
44 See note 5 and accompanying text.
45 Another potential solution to the collective action problem would be allowing class
action lawsuits against spam senders. This mechanism is not available under the CAN-SPAM
Act, but could be permitted by a state law. ISPs themselves face their own collective action problem: any action an ISP takes that successfully reduces the level of spam for the entire internet
would pass the vast majority of its benefits onto other ISPs and their customers. We should accordingly expect ISPs to take too few actions under any law governing spam. But see Hansell, 4
Big Internet Providers File Suits to Stop Leading Senders of Spam, NY Times at A1 (cited in note
40). The obvious solutions to the collective action problem are government enforcement, enforcement by coalitions of ISPs or industry organizations, and enforcement by consumer groups.
CAN-SPAM embraces the first two tactics, CAN-SPAM § 7, 117 Stat at 2712–15, but ignores the
third.
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that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message
46
or information attached thereto.
The provision has two parts. The portion up to “except” defines
the outer boundary of preempted state laws: any state law “that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages” is at least potentially preempted, while any that does not is not.
The latter portion of the provision—the savings clause—protects state
laws that otherwise would be preempted if they fall into certain categories.
The hard question in determining the scope of the entire provision is the scope of its savings clause. Section 8(b)(1) expressly preserves state laws that prohibit “falsity or deception in any portion of a
commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto.”
This clause could be interpreted in multiple ways, and how it is interpreted will have a substantial effect on states’ ability to target spam.
The section’s effect on state law enforcement methods is also unclear.
The provision clearly preempts a substantial portion of state
spam laws. For instance, the broadest provision of California’s law,
which went into effect January 1, 2004, and would have banned sending any commercial email advertisement without the recipient’s direct
47
consent, is clearly preempted. California’s statute expressly regulates
the use of electronic mail, and it goes far beyond prohibiting falsity or
deception. At the same time, many more narrowly drawn state laws
survive, and it is these provisions that must be effective against spam.
In analyzing the effects of the preemption provision, then, it is
helpful to know what kinds of laws have been passed to deal with
commercial electronic mail.
II. STATE REGULATION OF SPAM
By the time the CAN-SPAM Act went into effect, thirty-six states
48
had enacted some sort of law explicitly regulating commercial email.
These laws vary widely in scope, from simply requiring that vendors
label the spam they send to banning all spam messages sent without
explicit consent. This Part details the categories of substantive rules
that states have enacted.
Opt-in provisions. Opt-in provisions require that a recipient
specifically choose to receive messages. These provisions are the
46

CAN-SPAM § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529.2.
48 For an invaluable reference for all state and federal spam laws, I am indebted to David
E. Sorkin, Spam Laws (cited in note 16).
47
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strongest antispam laws and have been enacted by two states. They
are clearly preempted by the CAN-SPAM Act, as they “expressly regulate[] the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages” without
50
falling into the exception for laws prohibiting falsity or deception.
Opt-out provisions. Opt-out provisions require that spam
senders include a mechanism allowing email users to opt out of later
messages and require senders to comply with these requests. Typical
opt-out mechanisms include a reply email address, a toll-free telephone number, or a web form. These provisions are key parts of most
antispam laws, and they exist in twenty-one states, though different
states require different opt-out mechanisms. The CAN-SPAM Act’s
opt-out provision is relatively weak compared to some of the state
provisions, which it preempts.
Bans on false or misleading subject lines, false routing information, and the use of false third-party return addresses or domain names.
These are the other key provisions in most antispam laws. Thirty-two
states ban at least one type of false or misleading information in spam;
twenty ban all three. These provisions are explicitly saved from preemption (and largely duplicated) by the CAN-SPAM Act, as they are
state laws against “falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial
51
electronic mail message or information attached thereto.”
Subject-line labeling requirements. Twenty-two states require
spam labels at the beginning of the subject line, typically with a label
like “ADV” (for advertisement) for all spam messages or
52
“ADV:ADLT” for adult messages. Labels would permit easy filtering
of spam messages from a user’s inbox, but the CAN-SPAM Act preempts state laws that require such labeling. The Act itself has no labeling requirement, instead requiring “clear and conspicuous identification that the message is an advertisement or solicitation,” though not
53
necessarily in the subject line. This provision’s lack of specificity
makes it much harder to filter messages based on the required identification: under CAN-SPAM, email recipients cannot block all spam by
telling their software to block all messages containing “ADV” in the
49 See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529.2; 11 Del Code Ann §§ 937–38. This and the subsequent counts are based on the author’s compilation. For a full list of states having each type of
provision, see Appendix. The spam laws themselves can be found at Sorkin, Spam Laws (cited in
note 16).
50 CAN-SPAM § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
51 Id.
52 See, for example, Alaska Stat § 45.50.479(a) (Michie 2003) (requiring “ADV:ADLT” for
spam containing “explicit sexual material”). Four states require labeling only spam with adult
content. Six states require a single label for all spam, adult and otherwise. Twelve states require
labels for all spam, and more specific labels for spam with adult content. See Appendix.
53 CAN-SPAM § 5(a)(5)(A)(i), 117 Stat at 2708.
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header. Although the Act has no labeling requirement, it does grant
54
the FTC rulemaking authority to implement the Act. The FTC recently announced a requirement that sexually explicit spam be labeled
55
“SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT” in the subject line.
Contact information requirements. Fifteen states require that
spam messages contain some contact information for the sender: a
name, email address, mailing address, or phone number. These provisions vary greatly in what is required. The CAN-SPAM Act preempts
these provisions but requires that messages contain a physical postal
56
address.
Bans on selling software that can be used to falsify routing information. Fifteen states ban the sale of software designed to falsify
routing information or return addresses. The CAN-SPAM Act preempts only state laws that “expressly regulate[] the use of electronic
57
mail to send commercial messages.” Because these provisions apply
to the software, and the act of selling it, rather than to email, they
58
should be unaffected by the Act. They are also relatively powerless:
they prohibit the upstream act of selling the software, which won’t
prevent senders from using it.
Bans on violating ISP policies. Nine states prohibit, to one de59
gree or another, violations of an ISP’s terms of service. These provisions are intended to give the force of law to an ISP’s prohibitions on
sending spam. Their effectiveness in controlling spam is not clear for
several reasons. First, few states have these provisions. Second, they
apply only if an ISP prohibits sending spam. Not all ISPs will necessarily do so: while widespread adoption of such policies could lead to
spammer-friendly internet access selling for a premium, thus discouraging some spam by increasing the costs of sending it, even such elevated prices would nevertheless be less than the social harm from
spam, leaving an inefficiently high level of spam. Finally, these laws
don’t apply to spam sent from overseas or through hijacked computers, sources that account for a substantial portion of spam. These
54

Id § 13, 117 Stat at 2717.
Federal Trade Commission, Label for E-Mail Messages Containing Sexually Oriented
Material, 69 Fed Reg 21024 (2004) (final rule) (creating 16 CFR § 316.1). See also Marilyn Geewax, Feds: Smutty Spam Must Carry New Label, Atlanta J & Const D1 (Apr 14, 2004) (noting an
FTC estimate that 17 percent of pornographic emails contain graphic images “that appear
whether or not the user wants to see them”).
56 CAN-SPAM § 5(a)(5)(A)(iii), 117 Stat at 2708.
57 Id § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
58 See Part IV.A.
59 For an example of an ISP’s service terms, see EarthLink, Inc, EarthLink Internet Service
Agreement § 3 (Oct 1, 2004), online at http://www.earthlink.net/about/policies/dial (visited Nov
14, 2004) (“Using a dial-up account for high volume or commercial use (e.g., revenue generation,
advertising, etc.) is prohibited.”).
55
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laws are unaffected by the CAN-SPAM Act because they do not “expressly regulate[] the use of electronic mail to send commercial mes60
sages.”
States enforce all of these various substantive limits in a variety
of ways, from government or ISP enforcement actions (which have
parallels in the CAN-SPAM Act), to private lawsuits by spam recipients (which are not mentioned in the Act), and criminal penalties
61
(which exist in the Act, but only in limited form). The preemption
effect of the CAN-SPAM Act on these state-level enforcement provisions is unclear; the Act’s preemption provisions explicitly address
only substantive limits. In Part IV.B, I argue that, despite the seemingly broad language of its preemption provisions, the Act has no limit
on state enforcement provisions that differ from the federal limits.
III. A BRIEF TOUR OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The United States Constitution establishes that when valid fed62
eral and state laws conflict, the federal law has force. Federal law
63
preempts state law in two primary ways. First, Congress can preempt
state laws explicitly, with an express preemption clause. Second, even
absent any clear direction from Congress, a federal law may implicitly
preempt state laws. The Supreme Court has found two broad categories of implicit preemption: when the federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
64
for the States to supplement it,” a category known as field preemption; and when the state law conflicts with or “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
65
of Congress,” a category known as conflict preemption. Laurence

60

CAN-SPAM § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
For a state-by-state summary of state enforcement methods, see Appendix.
62 US Const Art VI, cl 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). See also McCulloch v
Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 406 (1819) (“The government of the United States . . . though
limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form
the supreme law of the land, ‘any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.’”); Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1, 211 (1824) (holding that “acts of the
State Legislatures . . . [that] interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress” are nullities
because “[i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State, though
enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it”).
63 On federal preemption generally, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles
and Policies § 5.2 at 376–401 (Aspen 2d ed 2002); Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional
Law § 6-28 at 1172–79 (Foundation 3d ed 2000).
64 Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230 (1963) (holding that Congress intended a
federal law regulating grain warehouses to supersede state warehouse regulations).
65 Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67–74 (1941) (holding that federal immigration law
preempted a Pennsylvania law requiring registration of legal aliens because the state law may
61
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Tribe characterizes these two types of preemption as jurisdictional and
66
substantive, respectively. In the former case Congress intends to be
the sole regulator, even when the state and federal laws would otherwise be entirely consistent, while in the latter case the state is substantively interfering with the federal purpose.
A. Express Preemption
The clearest preemption cases are those interpreting express preemption clauses. In those instances, determining the scope of the preemption clause is a straightforward matter of statutory construction.
Even when Congress has explicitly preempted state laws, though, the
scope of that preemption is rarely clear. As Erwin Chemerinsky has
noted, “provisions in federal statutes expressly preempting state and
local laws inevitably require interpretation as to their scope and ef67
fect.”
For instance, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969
provided: “No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes” meeting the law’s labeling re68
69
quirements. The Supreme Court in Cipollone v Liggett Group, Inc
held that this reasonably straightforward provision preempted application of state tort law to cigarette manufacturers but left in place a
70
claim for breach of express warranties. The Court reasoned that the
warranty obligations were created by contract, not by state law, and so
were not within the scope of the state law that Congress had intended
71
to preempt.
The Court in Cipollone applied its longstanding assumption that,
because the states’ general police powers are so well established, any
intention by Congress to supplant that authority must be shown by the
72
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Indeed, the Court is reluctant to infer preemption in ambiguous cases, but instead rests on the
73
presumption that “Congress did not intend to displace state law.”
Congress has the ability to make its intention to preempt clear, and so
have resulted in “inquisitorial practices and police surveillances that might . . . affect our international relations”).
66 Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 6-28 at 1177 (cited in note 63).
67 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 5.2.2 at 383 (cited in note 63).
68 Pub L No 91-222, 84 Stat 87, 88, codified at 15 USC § 1334 (2000).
69 505 US 504 (1992).
70 Id at 526 (Stevens plurality).
71 Id at 525–26.
72 Id at 516 (majority), quoting Rice, 331 US at 230.
73 Maryland v Louisiana, 451 US 725, 746 (1981) (holding that federal law preempted a
Louisiana tax on natural gas).
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when there is no explicit preemption clause it is reasonable to assume
that Congress did not intend to preempt.
74
However, in another tobacco case, Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly,
the Court interpreted the same provision at issue in Cippollone to
preempt a Massachusetts law banning outdoor cigarette advertising
near schools. The Court reasoned that Congress had in several ways
attempted to protect the public from the danger of minors smoking
75
and had vested the authority to regulate advertising in the FTC.
While the preemption clause was the direct authority to find preemption, the Court arguably went further and invoked field preemption,
inferring congressional intent to regulate comprehensively from
amendments expanding the federal advertising regulation and from
76
the scope of the regulations. The dissent argued that the Massachusetts law regulated only the location of the advertisement, not its content, and therefore the law didn’t constitute a requirement or prohibi77
tion based on smoking and health.
Lorillard illustrates that applying preemption clauses requires
ordinary statutory interpretation, but it also shows that the categories
of preemption can overlap: a statute could expressly preempt a category of state laws, and yet also implicitly preempt state laws more
78
broadly. Understanding the preemptive effect of a federal law thus
requires determining the result under both explicit and implicit preemption analysis.
B.

Field Preemption

The Court has struck down state laws when Congress has evidenced a desire to occupy the entire field of regulation. The classic
79
field preemption case is Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, which held
that states cannot regulate grain elevators licensed by the federal government. The Court reasoned that by replacing a system of dual regulation with one in which grain elevators needed only federal licensing,
74
75
76
77
78

533 US 525 (2001).
Id at 547–49.
Id at 547–48.
Id at 595–98 (Stevens dissenting).
As Laurence Tribe notes:

These three categories of preemption are anything but analytically air-tight. For example,
even when Congress declares its preemptive intent in express language, deciding exactly
what it meant to preempt often resembles an exercise in implied preemption analysis. So
too, implied preemption analysis is inescapably tied to the presumption that Congress did
not intend to allow state obstructions of federal policy, the existence of which is a central
inquiry in conflict preemption analysis.
Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 6-28 at 1177 (cited in note 63).
79 331 US 218 (1963).
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Congress intended to eliminate state requirements on those grain ele80
vators, despite its failure to say so explicitly. Congress, the Court concluded, intended to occupy the field of grain elevator regulation for
federally licensed elevators, and so any state regulation was pre81
empted.
82
Likewise, in City of Burbank v Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc, the
Court held that the Federal Aviation Act preempted local aircraft
noise regulations. The Court explained, “It is the pervasive nature of
the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise that leads us to con83
clude that there is preemption.” Such a pervasive scheme of federal
regulation seems to be a threshold requirement to find field preemption, but the law is far from clear: the Court has declined to find pre84
emption even in some cases of substantial federal regulation.
C.

Conflict Preemption

Finally, the Court has held that a state law is preempted if it
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
85
purposes and objectives of Congress.” The simplest case arises when
the state and federal laws conflict such that one could not simultaneously comply with both the state and federal laws, as in McDermott v
86
Wisconsin. Federal law required that cans of syrup be sold in their
87
original packaging, while Wisconsin law required that they be sold
88
only in state-approved packaging. Because a retailer could not com89
ply with both laws, the state law was preempted.
A more difficult determination is whether a state law obstructs
the accomplishment of a federal objective when the two laws do not
90
directly conflict. Two determinations must be made in such cases:

80

Id at 234–36.
Id at 235–36.
82 411 US 624 (1973).
83 Id at 633.
84 See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 5.2.3 at 388–91 (cited in note 63) (discussing
cases involving blood donation, music piracy, and welfare, where the Court declined to find
preemption).
85 Hines, 312 US at 67. See also Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 5.2.5 at 394–98 (cited in
note 63).
86 228 US 115 (1913).
87 Id at 130.
88 Id at 124–27.
89 Id at 132–34.
90 A prototypical case is Nash v Florida Industrial Commission, 389 US 235 (1967), which
held that a state law that denied unemployment benefits to those who filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was preempted by the federal statute establishing the
NLRB. A purpose of the federal statute was to encourage such filings, and a state law that penalized them stood as an obstacle to that purpose.
81
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what the purpose of the federal law is, and whether the state law hinders that purpose. The question often arises in cases of federal laws
setting safety or environmental standards, when the Court must determine whether Congress’s goal is to provide comprehensive, uniform, nationwide standards or simply to provide minimum standards.
In the former case, stricter state laws conflict with the federal purpose
and are thus preempted, while in the latter case the two laws are com91
patible. These cases often turn, then, on the court’s characterization
of the federal purpose. As Chemerinsky has noted:
If a court wants to avoid preemption, it can narrowly construe
the federal objective and interpret the state goal as different
from or consistent with the federal purpose. But if a court wants
to find preemption, it can broadly view the federal purpose and
92
preempt a vast array of state laws.
To determine the preemptive effect of the CAN-SPAM Act, then,
this Comment analyzes both the impact of the express preemption
clause and the impact of the Act according to implicit preemption
doctrine, both with respect to field preemption and conflict preemption. The Act’s express preemption clause clearly preempts many, per93
haps most, state spam laws. At the same time, the clause presents
some puzzles of interpretation. These questions are the focus of Part IV.
IV. APPLYING THE PREEMPTION CLAUSE
OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT
A state law that limits spam presents two potential questions of
effect. First, the state law’s substantive provisions might fall within the
scope of the CAN-SPAM Act’s preemption clause (and not be saved
by the savings clause). Second, even if a state law regulated the kind of
conduct that the CAN-SPAM Act explicitly permits states to regulate,
the Act might nevertheless limit the enforcement mechanisms available to a state. This Part addresses these two issues in turn, and then
considers some implications of the preemption clause’s scope.

91 Compare Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 US 88 (1992)
(holding that an Illinois law protecting workers who handled hazardous waste was preempted by
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), in part because OSHA had procedures for
state regulations to supplant federal ones on approval from the federal government), with Pacific
Gas & Electric Co v State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, 461 US
190 (1983) (holding that a California moratorium on the construction of nuclear power plants
was not preempted because its motivation was economics, not safety).
92 Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law § 5.2.5 at 398 (cited in note 63).
93 See Part I.B.
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A. Effect of the Preemption Clause on Substantive State Spam Laws
The CAN-SPAM Act “supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule
. . . that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or
rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial elec94
tronic mail message or information attached thereto.” This language,
while seemingly clear, leaves some questions unanswered. First, which
laws “expressly regulate[] the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages”? Second, when do such laws “prohibit[] falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or
information attached thereto”? Section 8(b) preempts a category of
state laws, but carves out a subset that is exempt from preemption.
The first question, then, determines the outer boundaries of the preemption clause, while the second determines the scope of its savings
clause.
The answer to the first question seems clear. Laws that expressly
regulate “the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages” will
expressly mention electronic mail. General laws that apply more
broadly than to spam—general bans on deceptive trade practices, for
instance—remain unaffected. Likewise, the preemption clause is limited to laws that apply to “commercial” email. Were a state to pass a
law regulating all email, commercial or otherwise, it would not be affected by the CAN-SPAM Act (though it would potentially face other
constitutional hurdles).
Perhaps more interestingly, the preemption clause applies only to
laws that regulate the use of electronic mail, not to ancillary activities
related to email. Laws that might be narrowly tailored to combating
spam, but not by regulating its use, fall outside the scope of the preemption clause and therefore are not preempted.
Good examples of this kind of law are state laws that ban the sale
of software designed to be used in spamming—to falsify email routing
95
information, for example. Fourteen states have such laws. Connecticut’s provision is typical: it prohibits selling or distributing software
that is “primarily designed or produced for the purpose of facilitating
or enabling the falsification of electronic mail transmission informa96
tion or other routing information” or is marketed for that purpose.
This law does not regulate the use of electronic mail any more than a
ban on possessing burglary tools regulates the act of breaking into a
94

CAN-SPAM § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
See text accompanying notes 57–58.
96 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53-451(c)–(d) (West 2001) (providing criminal penalties up to a
class D felony for violations of the statute).
95
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home. The provision therefore does not fall within the scope of the
CAN-SPAM Act’s preemption clause.
Determining whether a state law “expressly regulates the use of
electronic mail to send commercial messages,” and thus is (presumptively) preempted by § 8(b), is then a fairly straightforward matter: the
law must (1) expressly apply to email (2) that is commercial in nature,
and must (3) regulate the use of email, not just relate in some way
to email. Unless it meets these three criteria, the law is outside the
scope of the preemption clause and is therefore unaffected by the
97
CAN-SPAM Act.
Even if a state law does meet these criteria, and thus falls into the
scope of the preemption clause, it still survives if it meets the requirements of the savings clause. State laws meeting the three criteria are
preempted, except to the extent that they “prohibit[] falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or infor98
mation attached thereto.”
Congress’s primary concern in creating an exception for laws
prohibiting “falsity or deception” was to allow states to regulate the
99
use of spam for fraudulent purposes. Though Congress wanted to
avoid the problem of conflicting state standards with respect to things
like spam formatting, where both “legitimate” and illegitimate commercial email would be affected, it felt no such qualms about fraudulent spam, stating that “[s]tatutes that prohibit fraud and deception in
email do not raise the same concern [of inconsistency], because they
target behavior that a legitimate business trying to comply with rele100
vant laws would not be engaging in anyway.”
The choice, then, is between interpreting the savings clause narrowly, so that it applies only to laws aimed directly at consumer fraud,
or more broadly, so that that it applies to any falsity or deception in
spam messages. The former interpretation is more consistent with
Congress’s intent, while the latter is more consistent with the text of
the preemption clause.
States have targeted three main areas of falsity or deception in
spam: false routing information, false or misleading subject lines, and

97 Substantive state limits on spam are still subject to implicit preemption, but they probably would escape preemption under such an analysis. First, the CAN-SPAM Act is not the kind
of comprehensive scheme of federal regulation that invokes field preemption. See Part IV.B.2.
Second, the Act’s preemption clause seems well tailored to capture any state law that conflicts
with Congress’s objectives. Any law that survives the preemption clause does so largely because
it is consistent with those objectives.
98 CAN-SPAM § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
99 See S Rep No 108-102 at 21–22 (cited in note 32).
100 Id.
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101

false return addresses or domain names. Use of falsified routing information to hide the sender’s origin is probably not the type of consumer fraud Congress was concerned about. Nevertheless, such behavior is not what “a legitimate business trying to comply with relevant
laws” would engage in, and so the inconsistency concern doesn’t apply.
Congress’s intent is even consistent with a state law banning falsity or
misleading information in the body of a spam message, but such a law
would be broader than any state has gone.
Other potential state laws that arguably target “falsity or deception” in spam might not target the kinds of fraudulent acts Congress
was concerned about. For instance, a state could ban the “cloaking”
techniques that many spam senders use to get their messages past
102
spam filters. These techniques hardly represent the kind of consumer
fraud Congress was worried about. Cloaking techniques are designed
to fool spam filters, not consumers; a consumer who viewed such a
spam message and bought an advertised product would have been
fully aware of the message’s nature. These messages are deceptive to a
spam filter, but are not necessarily deceptive to the recipient.
The narrow interpretation of the savings clause would hold a law
banning cloaking techniques to be preempted, because it is not aimed
at the kind of consumer fraud that was Congress’s primary concern.
At the same time, though, there is no reason for “a legitimate business
trying to comply with relevant laws” to use these techniques; they’re
simply attempts to get one’s advertisement to consumers who have
taken active steps (or whose ISPs have taken steps) to avoid those
103
ads. It doesn’t accomplish any purpose of Congress to hold such a
law preempted.

101

See text accompanying note 51.
Common techniques include putting spaces inside words that would otherwise trip
filters (“F R E E”), see An In-Depth Look at Current Trends in Spamming Techniques,
Security Park (Mar 2, 2004), online at http://www.securitypark.co.uk/article.asp?articleid=22070
&CategoryID=33 (visited Nov 14, 2004) (describing the technique as “lost in space”); substituting characters for letters (“\/!A6RA”), see Mitch Wagner, Spammers’ Technology Secrets! Exposed!, InternetWeek (Feb 13, 2003), online at http://www.internetweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=6900020 (visited Nov 14, 2004) (discussing various spamming techniques); inserting nonsense HTML (“mill‹!-- xe64 --›ionaire”) that isn’t displayed on the recipient’s computer, see id; and using HTML character codes to represent letters (turning
“&#86;&nbsp;&#105;&nbsp;&#97;&nbsp;&#103;&nbsp;&#114;&nbsp;&#97;” into “Viagra” on
screen), see Leon Erlanger, Spam War, PC Mag (Mar 2, 2004) (describing spammers’ increasing
sophistication). The façade of randomness and innocent words conceals words that would otherwise trip a spam filter.
103 One could argue that attempts to get around filters are not illegitimate. The act of deceiving a filter is not illegal, and techniques used to defeat filters do not mislead consumers. It
seems unlikely, however, that Congress believed that argument. The CAN-SPAM Act requires
that spam recipients be able to opt out of future messages, CAN-SPAM § 5(a)(3)(A)(i), 117 Stat
102
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Though Congress framed its concern in terms of consumer fraud,
its primary concern in enacting the preemption clause was inconsistency in state laws that would make it hard for “legitimate” users of
commercial email to operate. Since no legitimate use requires deception, courts should adopt the broad reading of the savings clause so as
not to hinder states’ ability to regulate illegitimate spam email.
B.

State Enforcement Provisions

Another difficulty in applying § 8(b) is determining its effect on
state laws that ban falsity or deception in spam (and so are not preempted) but use enforcement mechanisms that differ from the CAN104
SPAM Act’s enforcement provisions. Two such measures are state
criminal penalties and state laws giving recipients of spam a private
right of action against spam senders.
For example, Washington State’s antispam law prohibits sending
commercial email that “(a) [u]ses a third party’s internet domain
name without permission of the third party, or otherwise misrepresents or obscures any information in identifying the point of origin or
the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail message; or (b)
105
[c]ontains false or misleading information in the subject line.” This
statute bans commercial email with some false or deceptive content,
and accordingly would be preserved under § 8(b)(1). At the same
time, though, the statute is enforced by a private right of action against
senders violating the law, with minimum damages of $500 per viola106
tion for consumers and $1,000 per violation for ISPs.
It may be the case that one of Congress’s objectives was to limit
spam enforcement, possibly to protect marketers against the threat of
thousands of individual lawsuits or class actions. The Act could implicitly limit all antispam enforcement to those limited enforcement
measures included in the CAN-SPAM Act, or alternatively to en107
forcement methods of the same types. Interpreting the preemption
clause as an implicit limitation on state enforcement mechanisms, so
as to strike the Washington state enforcement measures, might then be
at 2707, and Congress would presumably want to likewise honor consumers’ efforts to avoid
viewing spam messages.
104 See text accompanying notes 35–45.
105 Wash Rev Code Ann § 19.190.020 (West Supp 2004).
106 Id § 19.190.040.
107 Such a division of substantive provisions and remedies would be unusual, but not unprecedented. For example, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act provides for a private cause
of action by the recipient of an illegal marketing call but avoids the judicial costs of such lawsuits
by only permitting these cases to be brought in state courts under state law. See 47 USC
§ 227(b)(3). CAN-SPAM’s legislative history is silent on the issue of state enforcement of state
antispam provisions. See S Rep No 108-102 (cited in note 32).

File: Readthru 1

2005]

Created on: 1/24/2005 2:02:00 PM

Last Printed: 2/10/2005 3:30:00 PM

Preemption of State Spam Laws

375

truest to this intent. At the same time, striking it down could leave the
law with no enforcement mechanism. Such a result is unlikely to be
what Congress intended: an enforcement mechanism is fundamentally
linked to the substantive provision it enforces, and if Congress really
wanted to keep only the substantive half it likely would have been
more explicit.
Enforcement mechanisms present a more plausible case for implicit preemption than substantive provisions do: even if Congress did
not explicitly preempt state law enforcement techniques, it might have
intended to limit the kinds of enforcement available for use against
spam to those compatible with the federal objective or the federal
regulatory scheme. Because a state law can be preempted either due
to express preemption or implied preemption, we must look to both
kinds of preemption analysis.
1. Express preemption of enforcement mechanisms.
The best reading of the text of the Act’s preemption provision is
that it applies only to substantive limitations on the use of email for
108
commercial purposes. The Act is mostly focused on determining
which kinds of spam are permitted and which are banned. Congress
was careful to invalidate state laws that go beyond the substance of
the Act, such as the California and Delaware statutes that require opt109
in schemes for all spam. Congress was presumably less concerned
about how surviving state provisions are enforced, since the Act’s preemption clause makes no mention of enforcement.
The text of the Act is consistent with a reading of the statute as
being focused on state substantive provisions rather than state enforcement provisions. Section 8(b)(1) specifically saves from preemption “any [state] statute, regulation, or rule [that] prohibits falsity or
deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or
110
information attached thereto.” This is very broad language that was
designed to save state laws that are consistent with the Act’s provisions and permit what Congress considered to be legitimate advertising. Congress wanted to avoid both incompatible state limitations and
an outright ban, both of which would prevent any commercial email
from being legally sent, while ensuring that a law that was more nar111
rowly aimed at preventing consumer fraud was saved.

108
109
110
111

the Act:

See Part IV.A.
Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529.2; 11 Del Code Ann §§ 937–38.
CAN-SPAM § 8(b)(1), 117 Stat at 2716.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation noted in its report on
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Congress did not express the same degree of concern about
methods of enforcement. Enforcement provisions have no direct effect on the substantive rules advertisers live by, and while stronger
enforcement provisions might be more efficient to administer, and
thus result in less rule breaking, the existence of stronger enforcement
provisions won’t deter what Congress considers to be appropriate
spam. Enforcement differences also do not present the same concern
112
that Congress cited about inconsistency of state laws. If one state
113
requires that adult spam be labeled with “adv:adult,” and another
114
requires “ADV:ADLT,” then it becomes impossible to send lawabiding spam messages without knowing the destination of every message (or even what states each message will travel through). If one
115
state enforces its spam laws by allowing recipients to sue, though,
116
while another relies on the state attorney general, no conflict is created. As long as the substantive limits are consistent, a legitimate advertiser using email has no need to worry.
Although the CAN-SPAM Act limits its enforcement to ISPs and
government agencies, this could simply represent a judgment that private actions are not sufficiently important to justify federal court time.
A state could easily come to the opposite conclusion, and there is little
reason not to support that decision, especially since that state will foot
the bill for the use of its court system.
Finally, courts have long been reluctant to infer preemption
117
where Congress has been vague. The ultimate authority in determining the scope of a preemption clause is Congress, but because the re[A] State law requiring some or all commercial e-mail to carry specific types of labels, or to
follow a certain format or contain specified content, would be preempted. . . . Given the inherently interstate nature of e-mail communications, the Committee believes that this bill’s
creation of one national standard is a proper exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce that is essential to resolving the significant harms from spam faced by
American consumers, organizations, and businesses throughout the United States. This is
particularly true because, in contrast to telephone numbers, e-mail addresses do not reveal
the State where the holder is located. As a result, a sender of e-mail has no easy way to determine with which State law to comply.
S Rep No 108-102 at 21–22 (cited in note 32).
112 Id.
113 See, for example, Ark Code Ann § 4-88-603(a)(2) (Michie 2001) (requiring the label to
be included in the first nine characters of the subject line).
114 See, for example, Alaska Stat § 45.50.479(a).
115 See, for example, Colo Rev Stat Ann § 6-2.5-104(1)(a)–(b) (West 2002) (allowing both
recipients and ISPs to sue).
116 See, for example, Iowa Code Ann § 714E.2 (West 2003) (allowing the attorney general to
seek injunctive relief and civil penalties).
117 See Maryland v Louisiana, 451 US 725, 746 (1981) (discussing the presumption that
“Congress did not intend to displace state law”); Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law § 6-28 at
1176 (cited in note 63).
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sult of such a clause is to override the sovereignty of the states, the
Supreme Court demands clear guidance from Congress before reaching that result. Here, Congress has been anything but clear: the text of
the preemption clause, which is limited to discussing substantive rules,
does not support preemption of enforcement provisions. Neither does
Congress’s intent, which was to limit the inconsistency in state laws
and limit those laws to banning things that a “legitimate” spam sender
would not do. Holding illegitimate senders accountable in different
ways does not contradict that goal.
2. Implied preemption of enforcement mechanisms.
Even if Congress did not expressly preempt state causes of action
against spam senders when it passed the CAN-SPAM Act, those
causes of action might nevertheless be preempted according to one of
the theories of implied preemption, either because Congress has evidenced a desire to occupy the entire field of spam regulation (field
preemption) or because the state laws stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of a federal objective (conflict preemption).
Field preemption is a poor fit for the CAN-SPAM Act. A pervasive scheme of federal regulation is almost a threshold requirement
for finding field preemption: the Court seems to use such a pervasive
scheme as a rough test for whether Congress intends to occupy a field
118
of regulation. The CAN-SPAM Act probably does not qualify as
such a scheme. Though it applies to all commercial email affecting
interstate or foreign commerce and authorizes some regulation by the
FTC, this regulation is far from comprehensive: its only significant
administrative component authorizes, but does not require, the FTC to
119
set up a “do not email” registry.
More importantly, the cases where the Supreme Court has found
field preemption involve areas of law where Congress is ambiguous
about preemption and where a finding that Congress intended to
occupy the entire field is plausible. Here, Congress was explicit: it
prevented states from enacting laws varying in substance from the
CAN-SPAM Act, but it specifically left states with the ability to enforce essentially parallel provisions. This shows that rather than intending to occupy the field, Congress specifically intended to divide
regulation between the federal government and the states. Congress
has also expressed this intent in other ways: the Act gives state government agencies enforcement powers under federal law, alongside

118
119

See Part III.B.
CAN-SPAM § 9, 117 Stat at 2716.
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120

federal agencies and ISPs. Field preemption, accordingly, does not
apply to the CAN-SPAM Act.
Conflict preemption—whether state spam laws “stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
121
objectives of Congress” —is a somewhat closer question. It’s easy to
imagine a state spam law that stands as such an obstacle. California’s
law is one: its strongest provision bans all unsolicited commercial
email advertisements and requires prior consent or a business rela122
tionship for a company to send any such message. It also provides
harsh liquidated damages for any violation: $1000 per email message,
123
up to a total of $1 million. The former provision is clearly an obstacle
to one of Congress’s objectives in passing the CAN-SPAM Act: Congress aimed to create an environment where “legitimate” marketers
124
could make use of email, and the California law makes that impossible.
At the same time, the California enforcement provision—the severe liquidated damages provision—probably is not, when separated
from the California substantive provisions, an obstacle to the objectives of the CAN-SPAM Act. The damages provision applies to a
number of violations, from the ban on sending any spam without consent, to a ban on harvesting addresses from the internet for use in
125
spamming. Some of these violations are clearly beyond the intention
of Congress and are explicitly preempted; others are explicitly saved
from preemption. Those provisions that are not preempted are those
that permit techniques used by “legitimate” email marketers and are
thus consistent with Congress’s intent.
Allowing a consumer to sue over such a violation, or to obtain a
large liquidated damages amount, doesn’t change that calculation: if
the substantive provision is something Congress intended to permit,
then the law is (explicitly) preempted; and if it is not, then a state enforcement provision cannot make that enforcement contrary to Congress’s intent. Rather than impeding operation of the federal system,
state enforcement assists the federal system by dividing the workload
among federal courts, federal agencies, and state courts.
Indeed, Congress was careful in drafting the Act’s preemption
clause to ensure that no state law could escape preemption under that
120 Id § 7(b)(6), 117 Stat at 2712 (state insurance authorities); id § 7(f), 117 Stat at 2712 (state
attorneys general and agencies generally).
121 Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941).
122 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529.2.
123 Id § 17529.8(a)(1).
124 See note 32.
125 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529.4(a).
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clause while nevertheless interfering with Congress’s goals. Congress
wanted to ensure that email was available as an advertising method to
“legitimate” advertisers, and it designed the CAN-SPAM Act to permit that use. The preemption clause leaves in place only state laws that
do not interfere with that goal—state statutes that are not preempted
under conflict preemption analysis. Leaving state enforcement provisions in place is the best way to accomplish that intention.
V. SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The scope of its preemption clause will determine, in part, the
CAN-SPAM Act’s overall effectiveness. As explained in Part I, the Act
is broad in scope and prohibits many of the worst aspects of spam. It
contains at least some restrictions in nearly every potential area of
regulation the states have identified, short of banning spam outright
or limiting it to recipients who have opted to receive messages. In
other areas, however, the Act’s restrictions are weaker than those enacted by the states, and the Act ultimately ignores several ways to
fight spam. The set of tools available to fight spam will depend, then,
on the extent to which the Act permits these state laws to remain in
force: a narrow interpretation of the Act’s savings clause will hinder
states’ efforts to fight spam, while a broader interpretation could give
states stronger tools.
This is particularly important because the Act’s restrictions are
probably not the optimal way to reduce the volume of spam. By preempting substantial portions of most state spam laws, Congress has cut
off the states’ ability to experiment and determine the most effective
or cost-efficient antispam measures. Given that neither the CAN-SPAM
Act nor the state laws before it have been very effective in fighting
126
spam, giving states flexibility to find better laws could lead to more
127
effective antispam measures.
There are also several extralegal obstacles to effective spam con128
trol that the CAN-SPAM Act leaves unchanged. Despite the technical obstacles and the law’s weaknesses, though, the CAN-SPAM Act
might nevertheless be a significant boost in the fight against spam.
Recent studies show that the vast majority of spam comes from serv-

126

See note 10 and accompanying text.
At the same time, spam is fundamentally a national (and international) problem, and too
many inconsistent state laws might hamper the federal government’s ability to tackle the issue.
Conflicting state laws also make it much more difficult for legitimate marketers to take advantage of email. Congress was concerned about this effect on legitimate marketers. See note 32.
128 See notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
127
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129

ers located in the United States. More importantly, most of that spam
130
comes from a small number of servers—200 or fewer. This concentration of senders represents an opportunity to make a major dent in
the world’s spam problem, since the cost of fighting 200 senders is
substantially smaller than the cost of fighting millions of small-time
operators. Interpreting the CAN-SPAM Act as broadly as possible,
then, while permitting enforcement of broader state laws as well,
could actually have a substantial effect on the world’s spam problem.
Unfortunately, the CAN-SPAM Act’s enforcement provisions,
131
while relatively strong, are limited to ISPs and the government. For
those parties, the Act’s enforcement approach is fine as far as it goes.
It is, however, unnecessarily limited. ISPs have incentives to prevent
spam senders from targeting their customers, but lawsuits are expen132
sive, and the incentives probably result in too little ISP enforcement.
Likewise, government agencies are unlikely to have the resources or
motivation to track down more than a handful of senders, due to the
large volume of senders and the use of various methods to obscure the
identity of those senders. ISPs and government agencies are not the
only parties harmed by spam, and by limiting enforcement to them,
Congress neglects probably the most effective potential enforcers:
individuals and businesses who receive spam and are likely the group
most hurt by it.
A large company that provides internet access to its employees
for use in their work could face substantial costs in avoiding spam; all
consumers and companies that receive spam almost certainly face aggregate costs—from filtering or from time wasted wading through
129 See Gregg Keizer, Spam: Born in the USA, InformationWeek TechWeb News (Aug 12,
2004), online at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=28700163
(visited Nov 14, 2004) (reporting on a survey by message-filtering vendor CipherTrust, which
found that 86 percent of the world’s spam comes from the United States); CipherTrust, CipherTrust Spam Statistics, online at http://www.ciphertrust.com/resources/statistics/spam_sources.html
(visited Nov 14, 2004) (listing the top seventeen spam-producing nations, of which the United
States is the first). But see Sophos, Press Release, Sophos Reveals Latest “Dirty Dozen” Spam
Producing Countries (Aug 24, 2004), online at http://www.sophos.com/spaminfo/articles/
dirtydozenaug04.html (visited Nov 14, 2004) (reporting that only 43 percent of spam in one study
originated in the United States).
130 See Spamhaus, Register of Known Spam Operations, online at http://www.spamhaus.org/
rokso (visited Nov 14, 2004) (listing 200 spam operators who have been kicked off of at least
three ISPs for “serious spam offenses”); Keiser, Spam: Born in the USA, InformationWeek
TechWeb News (cited in note 129) (estimating that most spam comes from fewer than 200 U.S.based IP addresses).
131 See text accompanying notes 35–45.
132 See note 45. The Act does provide for the discretionary award of attorneys’ fees to ISPs.
CAN-SPAM § 7(g)(4), 117 Stat at 2715. Many spam senders, however, are likely to be judgment
proof. In any event, a substantial portion of the costs of enforcing the Act are likely to be technical, and thus not covered by the fees provision.

File: Readthru 1

2005]

Created on: 1/24/2005 2:02:00 PM

Preemption of State Spam Laws

Last Printed: 2/10/2005 3:30:00 PM

381

133

spam—greater than those faced by ISPs. Additionally, any cost borne
by ISPs is presumably passed on to customers; ISPs therefore may not
have the incentives to take the right level of action against senders. In
short, the CAN-SPAM Act relies on governmental and ISP third parties to vindicate consumers’ rights, but those parties’ incentives to do
so are unclear at best. The prospect of defending lawsuits brought by
consumers and businesses nationwide would surely encourage advertisers to obey the law. Interpreting the Act to permit such state law
enforcement provisions is most consistent with Congress’s intent in
passing the CAN-SPAM Act.
CONCLUSION
When it passed the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003, Congress replaced a
patchwork system of inconsistent, incomplete state spam regulations
with a uniform nationwide system that prohibits forged headers and
deceptive subject lines in commercial email, requires identification
information and opt-out mechanisms, and prohibits many methods used
to obtain email addresses and send messages without being traced. Despite this, neither the CAN-SPAM Act nor its predecessor state laws
have entirely stopped spam or even obviously reduced it in quantity.
Despite its billing as a law designed to reduce the spam problem,
the CAN-SPAM Act essentially legalizes and regulates spam messages
in the United States. Nevertheless, the Act’s preemption provisions,
which preempt most stronger state spam laws, still allow some that go
beyond the federal provisions. These potential state laws include both
additional substantive provisions and enforcement mechanisms. Interpreting the CAN-SPAM Act’s preemption provisions to permit enforcement of compatible state laws could be a substantial boost in the
fight against spam.

133 Arguably, the Act gives a large company that provides internet service to its employees
a right of action. The Act gives “provider[s] of Internet access service” the right to sue spammers.
CAN-SPAM § 7(g), 117 Stat at 2714–15. The Act defines “Internet access service” as “a service
that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over
the Internet, [possibly including] access to proprietary content, information, and other services as
part of a package of services offered to consumers.” Id § 3(11), 117 Stat at 2702 (referring to the
definition provided in 47 USC § 231(e)(4) (2000)). A large provider of internet service is providing “a service that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or other services
offered over the Internet,” even if it is not a paid service offered to consumers. This interpretation, however, is fairly clearly not what Congress intended, and its success in court is far from
certain.
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ISP right of action

liquidated damages

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

injunctive relief

recipient right of action

•

criminal provisions

attorney general enforcement

illegal to violate ISP spam policy

•

false routing software banned

•

•

•

illegal to harvest addresses

•
•

•

geographic jurisdictional limitations

•

must contain sender’s domain name

•

•

must contain sender’s mailing address

ban on false/third-party domain name

•

•

must contain sender’s name

ban on false/misleading subject line

•

•

must contain sender’s email address

ban on false routing info

subject-line label (adult content)

subject-line label

opt-in for all spam

•

•

Alaska

•

Arizona

•

Arkansas

•

California

•

Colorado

•

Connecticut

•
•

•
•

•
•

•

Florida

•

•

•
•

•

•
•

•

•

•

•

Delaware

Georgia

opt-out required

Alabama

attorneys must label spam

no statute

APPENDIX: STATE SPAM LAWS

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

•

•

•
•

•

134 This compilation of state spam laws is based on the information provided by David E.
Sorkin, Spam Laws (cited in note 16). The categorization by type in this Appendix is by the
author. State statutes can be found at Alaska Stat § 45.50.479 (Michie 2003); Ariz Rev Stat § 441372 (2003); Ark Code Ann §§ 4-88-601 to -607, 5-41-201 to -206 (Michie 2003); Cal Bus & Prof
Code §§ 17529, 17538 (West 2003); Colo Rev Stat §§ 6-2.5-101 to -105, 13-6-105, 13-6-403 (2000);
Gen Stat Conn §§ 53-451 to -453, 52-59b (2003); 11 Del Code Ann §§ 931, 937–41 (2000); Fla Stat
Ann § 668.60 et seq (West 2004); Idaho Code § 48-603E (2000); 720 ILCS 5/16D-1 to -7 (West
2003); 815 ILCS 511/1, 5, 10, 15, 505/2Z, 7 (West 2003); Ind Code §§ 24-5-22-1 to -10 (2003); Iowa
Code § 714E.1–2 (2000); Kan Stat Ann §§ 50-6, 107 (2003); La Rev Stat Ann §§ 14:73.1, 14:73.6,
14:106.A(7), 51:1741.1–3 (West 2003); 10 Me Rev Stat Ann § 1497 (West 2003); Md Comm Code
Ann §§ 14-3001 to -3003 (2002); Mich Comp Laws § 445.2501–08 (2003); Minn Stat §§ 325F.694–
95, 325F.70 (2003); Mo Rev Stat §§ 407.100, 407.1120, 407.1123, 407.1126, 407.1129, 407.1132,
407.1135, 407.1138, 407.1141 (2003); Nev Rev Stat §§ 41.705–35, 205.492–513 (2003); NM Stat
Ann §§ 57-12-11, -23 to -24 (Michie 2003); NC Gen Stat §§ 1-75.4, 1-539.2A, 14-453, 14-458
(2000); ND Cent Code §§ 51-27-01 to -09 (2003); Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2307.64 (Anderson
2004); 15 Okla Stat §§ 756.1, 776.1–7 (2003); Or Rev Stat § 646.607–08 (2003); 2003 Or Laws 910;
18 Pa Cons Stat §§ 5903, 7661 (2000); 73 Pa Cons Stat § 2250.1–8 (2002); RI Gen Laws §§ 11-52-1
to -8, 6-47-1 to -3 (2000); SD Cod Laws §§ 37-24-6, -36 to -40 (Michie 2004); Tenn Code Ann
§§ 47-18-2501 to -2502 (2003); Tex Bus & Comm Code Ann §§ 46.001–11 (West 2003); Va Code
Ann §§ 8.01-328.1, 18.2-152.2, 18.2-152.3:1, 18.2-152.4, 18.2-152.12 (Michie 2003); Wash Rev Code
§§ 19.190.010–50 (2000); W Va Code §§ 46A-6G-1 to -5 (2000); Wis Stat § 944.25 (2001); Wyo Stat
§§ 40-12-401 to -404 (2003). Restrictions on attorney email are mandated by state bar rules in
Florida and Louisiana, and by a state supreme court rule in Kentucky. See Fla Rules Prof Conduct, 4-7.6(c)(3); La Rules Prof Conduct 7.2(b)(iii)(B); Ky S Ct Rule 3.130(7.09)(3).
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North Carolina

•

North Dakota

•

•

Ohio
Oklahoma

•

Oregon

•

Pennsylvania

•

•

Rhode Island

South Dakota

•
•

•
•

•

Missouri

South Carolina

•

•

Michigan

New York

•

•

•
•

Maine

Mississippi

false routing software banned

•

Illinois

Massachusetts

illegal to harvest addresses

geographic jurisdictional limitations

must contain sender’s domain name

•

must contain sender’s mailing address

must contain sender’s email address

•

must contain sender’s name

ban on false/third-party domain name

ban on false routing info
•

ban on false/misleading subject line

opt-out required

subject-line label (adult content)

subject-line label

opt-in for all spam

attorneys must label spam

•

•

Idaho

Kentucky
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subject-line label
subject-line label (adult content)
opt-out required
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•
•
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Texas
•
•
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Wyoming

West Virginia
•

•
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Virginia
•

Washington
•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•
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•

illegal to violate ISP spam policy
•

•

•

•

•

injunctive relief

•

criminal provisions

•

attorney general enforcement

false routing software banned

illegal to harvest addresses

geographic jurisdictional limitations

must contain sender’s domain name

must contain sender’s mailing address

must contain sender’s name

must contain sender’s email address

ban on false/third-party domain name

ban on false/misleading subject line

•

liquidated damages

•
•

ISP right of action

•

Vermont
ban on false routing info
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